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Abstract 
A fundamental principle of all truth-conditional approaches to semantics is that the meanings 
of sentences of natural language can be compositionally specified in terms of truth conditions, 
where the meanings of the sentences’ parts (words/lexical items) are specified in terms of the 
contribution they make to such conditions their host sentences possess. Thus, meanings of 
words fit the meanings of sentences at least to the extent that the stability of what a sentence 
might mean as specified in a theory is in accord with the stability of what a word might mean 
as similarly specified. In this paper, I shall be concerned with Ludlow’s (2014) idea that, in 
fact, there need be no such sympathy between words and sentences. He proposes that we can 
square what he calls a dynamic lexicon, where word meaning is not stable at all, with a 
traditional truth-conditional approach of the kind indicated, where sentence meaning is 
delivered via ‘absolute truth conditions’. I share Ludlow’s aspiration to accommodate dynamic 
features of word meaning with a truth conditional approach, but not his belief that the marriage 
is an easy deal. Thus, I shall present a problem for Ludlow’s position and show how resolving 
this problem leads to an alternative picture of how the meaning of a sentence may be truth-
conditionally specified with all relevant dynamic features of the lexicon retained. 
Keywords: dynamic lexicon; Ludlow, Peter semantic underdetermination; truth conditional 
semantics 
1: Introduction 
Truth-conditional semantics comes in various philosophical and formal flavours. Some of the 
differences will be pertinent to what follows. What is agreed upon by all, however, is that the 
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meanings of sentences of natural language (park for the moment whether one’s primary 
concern is sentence types or utterances thereof) is to be compositionally specified in terms of 
truth conditions for the sentences, where the meanings of the sentences’ parts (words/lexical 
items) are specified in terms of the contribution they make to such conditions their host 
sentences possess. As intimated, there are many ways of spelling out this basic idea, but what 
appears to be essential is that the meanings of words fit the meanings of sentences at least to 
the extent that the stability of what a sentence might mean as specified in a theory is in accord 
with the stability of what a word might mean as similarly specified. In this paper, I shall be 
concerned with Ludlow’s (2014) idea that, in fact, there need be no such sympathy between 
words and sentences. He proposes that we can square what he calls a dynamic lexicon, where 
word meaning is not stable at all, with a traditional truth-conditional approach of the kind 
intimated, where sentence meaning is delivered via ‘absolute truth conditions’. I share 
Ludlow’s strategic aspiration to accommodate dynamic features of word meaning with a 
general truth-conditional approach, but demur when it comes to his tactics. Thus, I shall present 
a problem for Ludlow’s approach and show how resolving this problem leads to an alternative 
picture of how the meaning of a sentence may be truth-conditionally specified with all relevant 
dynamic features of the lexicon retained. Thus, I come in peace, and want Ludlow to have his 
cake and eat it; I just don’t want him to eat his cake exactly how he proposes.   
2.1: Truth Conditions 
For present purposes, let a semantic theory for language L comprise an assignment of 
(parameterised) truth conditions t to each sentence s of L such that t holding of s is a function 
of the syntactic composition (at the appropriate level of analysis―LF for the nonce1) of the 
lexical items that constitutes s along with appropriate valuation of the open parameters. If such 
is the desideratum, then the theory has to assign to each lexical item l whatever property of l 
contributes to the truth conditions of every s that hosts l. Think of this property as simply the 
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semantic value of l allied with the appropriate type category, where we may ignore whether 
these values are extensions or intensions. So far so familiar.  
        Note two consequences of this picture. First, if we assume that any lexical ambiguity is 
syntactically resolved (e.g., bank [side of river] and bank [financial institution] are distinct 
items and are treated as such syntactically) and that all context-sensitivity is parameterised, 
then the semantic values of lexical items will apparently be uniform. They would fail to be so 
only if their extensions (/intensions) are such as to vary in ways not recorded by the theory, 
which would thus fail to deliver determinate truth conditions. In other words, the standard 
picture is that all factors to which changes of extension might be sensitive are already 
parameterised. Secondly, since the theory is abstracted from speaker-hearers of a language save 
as they might feature as values for parameters (speakers, hearers, addresses, etc.), the semantic 
properties of the language will be static, or timeless, as far as the theory is concerned; that is, 
the theory does not accommodate any shift of extension over time. In sum, a theory on the 
model on offer presents lexical items as possessing fixed determinate semantic values across 
speaker-hearers and times.  
       Some such view as this is perfectly standard in philosophical and semantic circles and is 
reflected in how lexical items are treated as invariant semantic atoms, whose contribution can 
be specified disquotationally or via some uniform algebraic relation (again, parameterisation 
apart).2 It remains a separate question, however, whether lexical items are so accommodating; 
on the dynamic view espoused by Ludlow, they most certainly are not. If that view is right, and 
I think it is, the pressing question is: how can, if at all, the standard truth-conditional approach 
accommodate a dynamic lexicon? First, then, I want to commend Ludlow’s view.  
2.2: The dynamic lexicon 
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A lexical item counts as dynamic on Ludlow’s view because of two features: negotiation of 
semantic value and underdetermination. The first feature is that the extension of lexical items 
is always open to negotiation or litigation by speakers of the language. When realised, such 
negotiation can lead to quite radical results, such as Pluto no longer being counted as a planet 
(see Ludlow, 2014, pp. 42-51, for a delightful discussion of the ins and outs of the decision to 
reclassify Pluto). Most often, though, lexical negotiation will involve what is to count as a cake 
or doll (to use Ludlow’s examples), or a sport rather than a pastime, or one style of music as 
opposed to another, and so on indefinitely. On reflection, one should recognise that such 
decisions on extensions are ubiquitous; there frequency, however, is not the point. Any lexical 
item (at least the open class ones3) have extensions that are open to negotiation and decision 
by speaker-hearers. In this sense, the meaning of a lexical item, insofar as it is supposed to 
determine an extension, is not accommodated by the traditional static picture of the truth-
conditional framework. Such a framework tells us what the extension of a lexical item is 
(modulo context-sensitivity) in one shot, as it were; yet if such extensions are essentially apt to 
be negotiated, then no theory could specify lexical extensions once and for all, and so couldn’t 
do so for truth conditions. 
         A similar conclusion is reached upon consideration of underdetermination, the second 
feature Ludlow takes to characterise lexical items. The underdetermination thesis is that the 
extension of a lexical item is underdetermined by the standing meaning of the item cognised 
by speakers of the relevant language, i.e., different, incompatible extensions can be taken by a 
lexical item on different occasions of its tokens, consistent with a single standing meaning (the 
item is not ambiguous).  So, even if no negotiation or decision is in the offing vis-à-vis some 
given lexical item, its extension is not statically determined by the language alone, for diverse 
extensions are available compatible with the understanding of the item of any given 
interlocutors.4 Ludlow leads with the example of book. In answer to the question, ‘How many 
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books have you written?’, different criteria may apply that variously include or exclude co-
authored books, edited collections, Ph.D. theses, unpublished book-length manuscripts, on-line 
copy, etc. In the absence of some further specification as to what is to count as a book in the 
present context, there is no right answer as to what falls under the extension of book. Analogous 
reasoning can be readily concocted for much about any open class item one may consider (cp., 
Asher, 2011) 
        The import for the traditional static conception is much the same as detailed above for the 
negotiated aspect of lexical extensions. Absent some specification of what is to count as falling 
into the extension of the given lexical item in the present context of utterance, one cannot say 
that the item has any determinate extension, and so it follows that sentences lack determinate 
truth conditions. The problem for the traditional conception, of course, is simply that it does 
not accommodate any further specification of extensions beyond what can be parameterised, 
but the kind of underdetermination exhibited does not fall under a contextual parameter, at least 
not the kind anyone has ever proposed.5  
        My purpose in this paper is not to defend a dynamic conception of the lexicon, so I shall 
not here address the myriad responses that might be imagined on behalf of the traditional 
conception. My intent is to see if the dynamical conception is, after all, compatible with a truth-
conditional framework, albeit, obviously, shed of its static pretence. Still, it is worthwhile to 
pause on a general point Ludlow rightly emphasises. 
         Granting that lexical items are open to negotiation and underdetermined certainly shows 
show that aspects of meaning (whatever determines extension) are multiple and non-static.  So 
much, though, does not entail the absence of a basic or primitive meaning, which fixes a 
canonical extension. The openness there is to lexical items, therefore, might pertain to the 
availability of secondary meanings without affecting the putative basic meaning. Ludlow 
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(2014, pp. 81-3) endorses semantic egalitarianism, which is the simple denial of this 
suggestion: of a range of potential extensions for an item, there is not a basic or canonical one. 
I endorse semantic egalitarianism, too, but Ludlow says little in defence of the thesis; so, a brief 
discussion is appropriate. 
        Some form of semantic privilege is very tempting, but I’d wager that its intuitive pull is 
due to a conflation of privilege with two perfectly innocent and plausible theses that are not in 
tension with a dynamic conception of the lexicon.  
      It is undeniable that the meanings of lexical items have a history, as it were, where an 
original meaning is retained or blended with novel construals. Take Ludlow’s own example of 
book. Transparently, any notion of an e-book or an on-line manuscript is historically derivative 
of a hard copy (published or not). For any given pair of construals, one might be able to tell 
some such history of dependence. Let’s assume one could. The thought, encouraged, therefore, 
is that there is an asymmetric dependence between construals, and that the dependent construal 
is non-basic, open to the kind of change and triggering the dynamic view seeks to generalise 
erroneously.  
       This thought is fundamentally mistaken, even granting that one could tell some such 
asymmetric dependence story across the board. The problem is simply that the relevant notion 
of lexical meaning must be local to the speaker-hearers whose language is our topic of inquiry. 
Consider again the case of book just presented. The notion of an e-book is historically grounded 
in the notion of a hard copy, but why should that matter to an all-too-modern speaker-hearer 
more au fait with computers than libraries? In essence, the hypothesis tabled is merely a 
sophisticated version of the etymological fallacy, whereby the history of a word is taken to be 
constitutive of its content. So, sure, there are lots of historical asymmetric dependencies, such 
is just what it is for something to be historical. What is required to spike the guns of the dynamic 
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view is a synchronous asymmetric dependence. Maybe a story could be told that makes such 
relations both pervasive and plausible. Still, it is wholly unclear how such a story would go 
without falling back into etymology.    
        The second source, I think, of the intuitive appeal of the idea of a unique basic meaning 
is a conflation of invariance with privilege. Diverse work in lexical semantics and syntactic 
theory has given great plausibility to the idea that lexical items possess a core invariant 
meaning. Ludlow (2014, p. 99) is happily swayed by this plausibility.6 What such work entails, 
however, is that not every aspect of meaning is dynamic in the relevant sense; that is, not every 
aspect of lexical meaning is open to negotiation/litigation or is underdetermined. It is crucial, 
though, to be clear on the structural nature of the kind of invariances plausibly uncovered by 
linguistic theory. Mostly, they pertain to argument structurehow many arguments, what kind 
of arguments, and what grammatical relations arguments may take to the syntactic projection 
(e.g., alternation options). These invariances do not fix a unique extension for any lexical item, 
but rather constrain possible extensions. Indeed, Grimshaw (2005) has claimed that, from this 
perspective, all lexical items belonging to a class of the same argument properties amount to 
linguistic synonyms. As Ludlow notes, this conception of invariance is perfectly compatible 
with a dynamic view of the lexicon, which is not intended to be a species of Humpty-
Dumptyism. The dynamic view, at least as propounded by Ludlow, does not insist on such 
invariances, but if they do obtain, then they serve as constraints on the diversity of extensions 
a lexical item might express. There might be richer invariances of the kind that underwrite 
various analyticities, sometimes captured by meaning postulates. Again, however, it is unclear 
why any such invariances would support a privileged extension. Suppose, for example, that it 
is analytic that books contain words, can be read, have authors, and so on. Such relations hold 
across the diversity of extensions book may take.         
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         Hereafter, then, let’s assume that lexical items are as Ludlow depicts them to be. Given 
the apparent dissonance of such a conception with the traditional static truth-conditional 
framework, a natural move would be to seek to dispense with the received view in favour of 
some other conception. Ludlow pursues a more nuanced path, which will be in focus for the 
remainder of the piece. 
3: Squaring a dynamic lexicon with a truth-conditional framework 
 My talk about a truth-conditional framework has failed to disambiguate what for some is a 
crucial bifurcation, viz., whether the framework appeals to truth in a model or absolute truth. 
The difference can be sourced to Tarski’s different approaches to the semantics of formal 
languages (cp., Milne, 1999; Etchemendy, 1990). The model-theoretic approach effectively 
treats language as an uninterpreted symbol system. A model consists of (i) a set of entities of 
the relevant kinds and (ii) an interpretation function that maps such entities onto the elements 
of the language. Further functions are called upon to interpret the effect of various permissible 
compositions within the language. Truth conditions for the sentences of the language are thus 
definable only relative to a model that assigns various extensions to the linguistic expressions. 
A change of model, for example, may preserve the distribution of truth and falsehood over the 
language’s sentences, but issue in radically distinct truth conditions (thus, logical notions are 
definable in terms of conditions holding across all models).  
        A framework that trades in absolute truth is one that takes the language to have a fixed 
interpretation, which the theory seeks to capture (just how such facts are fixed is a matter that 
can, in principle, be settled in various ways consistent with the theory). Thus, the sentences of 
the language have fixed truth conditions (assuming some process of disambiguation), and so 
the concept of truth is understood to be invariant or absolute, for there is just the one 
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interpretation at issue. As with the question of what fixes the facts of interpretation, what makes 
a sentence true can be settled in various ways consistent with the general framework. 
       There is a small literature arguing that an absolute conception of truth is the only one 
suitable for semantic theory for a natural as opposed to formal language (Lepore, 1982; 
Higginbotham, 1988, 1993). Glanzberg (2014), however, is right to be sceptical of the 
supposed Homeric struggle, as it were, insofar as, if natural as opposed to formal language is 
at issue, then the so-called model-theoretic approach simply collapses into the absolute 
conception, for a specific intended interpretation is always presupposed. Only if one is seeking 
to characterise some notion of logical truth or consequence might different models be relevant. 
Such a putative collapse goes in the direction of the absolute conception. Still, a feature of the 
model-theoretic approach is commonly assumed with or without explicit commitment to the 
conception. As mentioned, a model consists of a universe of objects, some means of composing 
such objects, and a function that assigns objects to linguistic material. Most familiarly, we take 
the entities of the model to be ur-elements of a set-theoretic universe, and sets to be further 
entities, or, equivalently, to be functional specifications of such entities (characteristic 
functions). The important point for our purposes is that such entities have precise individuation 
conditionsthey are static, fully determined. Such a view naturally goes over to the absolute 
conception, for if truth conditions on such a view are ways the world might be such that a 
sentence might be true or false, then they too will presumably involve fully determinate entities 
insofar as the world as it is anyway is not subject to our negotiation or construal, only what we 
say by an utterance might be. At first pass, then, the distinction between a model-theoretic and 
an absolute conception of the truth-conditional framework seems irrelevant to our purposes: on 
either conception, a dynamic conception of the lexicon is incompatible with the basic truth-
conditional approach. Not so, suggests Ludlow.  
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        The matter turns on the basic theory form in which an absolute conception is couched. A 
model-theoretic form assigns linguistic expressions entities from the model. Very roughly, for 
example: 
(1)a [[Kansas]]j = Kansas7  
     b [[flat]]j = x. flat(x)  
Statements such as these say that the interpretation function j assigns to the lexical items some 
function designated in the metalanguage via an expression with the same extension as the 
relevant object-language expressions. For the sentence, after some manipulation, we have: 
(2)  [[Kansas is flat]]j = T↔ {x: x = Kansas}  {x: flat(x) } 
The meanings of the lexical items are given via model-theoretic objects, such as functions and 
sets, and truth conditions are similarly given via operations on sets. The language of the theory 
(the metalanguage) thus specifies what sentences of the target language mean via a function 
that effectively maps abstract entities onto the linguistic items of the language. Insofar, then, 
as we take sets, functions and other such denizens of models to be precisely individuated, fully 
determinate entities, a marriage of a model-theoretic semantics and a dynamic lexicon is out. 
Why should we think a different conclusion is on the cards once the dynamic view is paired up 
with an absolute conception? The answer, for Ludlow, rests on the theory form appropriate for 
the absolute conception. Ludlow presents a standard form along the following lines: 
(3)a v[x, Kansas] ↔ x = Kansas 
     b v[x, flat] ↔ x is flat 
By a relevant compositional principle and rules of substitution, we have the following example 
a theorem (see Ludlow, 2014, pp. 107-8): 
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(4) v[T, Kansas is flat] ↔ Kansas is flat 
The crucial point here is that the theory does not assign entities to lexical items and sentences, 
but states conditions under which the items/sentences have certain semantic properties by way 
of employing the very language at issue in the metalanguage of the theory (it wouldn’t matter, 
of course, if German was used). So, the VP is flat isn’t assigned the set of flat things as its 
extension, but we are told that to be the semantic value of the VP is equivalent to being a flat 
thing. In this sense, the metalanguage simply inherits the conceptual content of the object-
language, and specifies semantic properties in such terms without introducing its own generic 
ontology of sets or functions. As Ludlow (2014, p. 108) puts it:  
But now notice that we did all this without introducing the usual machinery (utilizing 
properties, sets, functions) that is supposed to be precise (and determinate). What is 
interesting about our axiom for ‘flat’ is that it takes advantage of the underdetermined 
meaning of ‘flat’ in the metalanguage… I am not making a claim against contemporary 
formal semantics. There is no question but that formal semantics has been extremely 
fruitful and that it has provided many profound discoveries and insights into the nature 
of language… None of these discoveries, however, rests upon the assumption of a precise 
or determinate metalanguage... The point is that for the most part all the actual results of 
semantics are preserved if we reject the idea of precision in the metalanguage.  
      The difference between the two approaches, therefore, might be expressed in terms of the 
different weight the metalanguage of the respective theories carries. On the absolute 
conception, the metalanguage simply inherits its concepts from the object-language, as well as 
providing various logical and semantic machinery. The relevant expressions of the 
metalanguage are specified as referring to whatever the corresponding object-language 
expressions refer to. The model-theoretic approach, by contrast, introduces novel ontological 
categories, such as sets and functions, to serve as extensions for the object-language 
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expressions. The relevant expressions of the metalanguage, therefore, can be said to refer to 
what the corresponding object-language expressions refer to only given a weighty theoretical 
claim to the effect that the metalanguage actually provides the right ontology for the object-
language rather than simply specifying what the object-language expressions mean. To this 
extent, the absolute conception appears to be fundamentally less committing than the model-
theoretic view, for the former takes no position on how to unpack the ontological significance 
of an expression’s contribution to the truth conditions of its host sentences. I hedge this claim 
for the matter will turn on how the two conceptions are to be best construed. At the level of 
ideology, at least, the absolute conception is neutral in a way the model-theoretic conception 
is not, and it is precisely this difference Ludlow seeks to exploit. 
        Ludlow’s basic idea is that since the metalanguage inherits its concepts from the object-
language—at any rate, the concepts employed to specify the extensions of the object-language 
expressions—the metalanguage will inherit any properties of the object-language. In particular, 
therefore, the dynamic properties of the object-language lexicon will be inherited by the 
metalanguage lexicon. If a semantic theory along the lines decreed by the absolute conception 
meets whatever adequacy criteria are appropriate, then it will continue to do so on the 
assumption that the lexicon of the language in question is dynamic, for the character of the 
lexicon is irrelevant to the theory, insofar as it simply passes up whatever properties the lexical 
items possesses from the object- to the metalanguage. This, of course, is just the policy 
Davidson (1984, p. 31) commends: ‘the mystery is transferred from the word […] in the object 
language to its translation in the metalanguage’. Neither Davidson nor Ludlow think that there 
really is any mystery hereabouts, only a phenomenon that an adequate theory does not explain.  
      At first blush, this line of reasoning might seem too quick by half. True enough, it might 
be thought, the dynamic properties can be inherited from the object- to the metalanguage, but 
that postpones the problem rather than resolves it. The problem is how to square the essential 
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dynamic features of the lexicon with the compositional stability of truth conditions. No such 
concern arises, beyond the usual cases, for a marriage of a static lexicon with static truth 
conditions, but the problem appears insuperable, if one seeks to marry the static and the 
dynamic. Of course, one might think that a dynamic lexicon ineluctably leads to dynamic truth 
conditions, but if so, it is unclear how the standard truth-conditional format Ludlow favours is 
supposed to specify such conditions. A world that contains books on one construal of book (an 
e-book) need not be a world that contains books on another construal of book (concrete 
particulars).On the first construal, in some given world, The book is black would be false or 
nonsense, whereas on the second construal it might well be true, but the bare specification of 
truth-conditions Ludlow commends does not differentiate between the cases, for ‘The book is 
black is true iff the book is black’ will be the result on either construal. Ludlow has an answer 
to this kind of quandary, albeit one motivated by a slightly different concern pertaining to 
bivalence, to which I shall return in §4 (see Ludlow, 2014, pp. 111-2). 
      Ludlow does not think of a truth-conditional theory as targeting a static language; instead, 
a theory is effectively about the kind of conversational exchanges between speaker-hearers in 
which dynamic features of the lexicon are realised. To this extent, the theory does trade in 
dynamic truth conditions, but not because it explains or otherwise encodes the dynamic 
features of the lexical items, but because the theory takes sentences as used in dynamic 
conversations as its object, not sentences as abstract types.  Thus: 
I take the semantic theory to be a theory which computes the semantic values of utter-
ances (or, if you prefer, tokens)—not sentences construed as abstract objects (this is a 
distinctively anti-Kaplanian assumption which I won’t defend here) (Ludlow, 2014, p. 
112).   
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The crucial move now is to restrict the object-languages of utterances amenable to a truth-
conditional approach to be those for which the question of truth can be settled. Ludlow (op cit.) 
offers the following principle: 
Microlanguage S-admissibility: No utterance u of a sentence S is admissible in a 
microlanguage L, unless discourse participants (tacitly) agree that the terms of S are 
modulated so that an utterance of the sentence will be determinably either true or false.  
So, sentence types will be indeterminate and underdedeterminaed in various respects, but as 
any such type is tokened, interlocutors must at least recognise an assertion being made, and so 
treat the token as possessing a truth value under conditions they may tacitly converge upon. 
The position has obvious sympathies with Davidson’s (1986) conception of a ‘passing theory’, 
which Ludlow (2014, pp. 113-4) readily acknowledges. Davidson, however, notoriously 
concludes that ‘there is no such thing as a language’ as an invariant structure or a stable body 
of information. Such a conception goes well beyond what Ludlow at least recognises as the 
proper remit of a semantic theory, for there might well remain all manner of semantically 
significant invariances even after one has factored out what is peculiar to filling out the 
conditions involved in Ludlow’s principle of admissibility. Prudentially, Ludlow (ibid., p. 114) 
observes:  
[T]here must be stable elements to the construction of a passing theory; otherwise it is 
difficult to see how it could be possible. It is a safe bet that most of the nonterminal 
semantic rules are stable across these shifts (they may well be stable across all human 
languages). Thus the real dynamic portion would be in constructing the terminal (lexical) 
rules on the fly.  
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In essence, the suggestion here is that dynamic factors affect the lexicon alone, leaving 
invariant syntax and any other purely structural conditions on meaning a semantic theory 
properly targets.  
4: A friendly alternative 
There is so much that is accurate and insightful in both the detail and general arrangement of 
pieces in Ludlow’s position that my objections skirt churlishness. My aim, however, is not to 
nit-pick, but to show how all that is crucial to Ludlow’s general position can be preserved while 
dropping the notion that the object of a semantic theory is a microlanguage; indeed, I shall 
suggest that what motivates the introduction of the microlanguage notion is a construal of 
semantic theory that is too wedded to the very static conception Ludlow renounces, i.e., an 
undue concern for bivalence as a property of a theory of sentence types. 
      First, let’s consider the question of what a semantic theory is about. The obvious answer is 
‘language’, of course, but that leaves everything more or less open, given that language can be 
broadly or narrowly construed. Let’s take our lead from generative linguistics, however, and 
understand language narrowly as a lexicon plus syntactic operations defined over it. On this 
conception, a semantic theory being about language would amount to it being about the set of 
conditions syntax and lexical items impose upon meaning, which pretty much amounts to 
Ludlow’s observation quoted at the end of the last section. But what is meaning? Let’s 
reformulate slightly and say that a semantic theory is about the conditions language alone 
(lexicon plus syntax) imposes upon what one can literally say. The basic linguistic phenomena, 
therefore, are of the following form: 
(BLP) A can use S to say P in C 
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A semantic theory is a theory of the values of ‘S’ as conditions upon the values of ‘P’. Such a 
characterisation fails to decide if the conditions S imposes upon P are often or even ever 
determining of P. Consider the following case: 
(5) Bill borrowed a red pen 
The properties of S alonethe type Bill borrowed a red penwill place fixed, non-negotiable  
conditions upon what one can say with (5), such as the following: (i) Bill is the recipient of a 
borrowing; (ii) there is an unspecified lender; (iii) the object transferred is a pen; and (iv) the 
pen counts as red for the speaker. This is quite a bit, but other factors a left underdetermined, 
such as what it is for the pen to count as red: a pen with a wholly red surface or partially red 
surface (does the interior of the pen count?); a pen that writes red, but could have a surface of 
any colour; a pen with a red plastic cap; a pen classified as red (belonging in the red tray); a 
pen that merely looks red in certain lighting; and so on. Examples such as this can be multiplied 
indefinitely (cp., Lahav, 1989; Travis, 1997). The general moral is that narrow linguistic 
properties will fix conditions on possible propositions expressible via sentence tokens, but 
other crucial ingredients will be left unfixed by the language alone, to be determined on an 
occasion of use by extra-linguistic conditions.8  
         Ludlow’s realm of the dynamic falls squarely within the extra-linguistic as I am here 
conceiving of it. A semantic theory targets the type properties of linguistic material as invariant 
conditions on what can be literally said with such material. Dynamic features are, eo ipso, not 
invariances of content, but matters of construal selected by speakers on the occasion of use, or 
at least features highly sensitive to variant conditions of use and open to negotiation. Since 
such dynamic aspects of the lexicon are not part of the language narrowly conceived, they are 
not features a semantic theory will specify or otherwise explain. Content, on this view, as what 
can literally be said with a sentence, will be left undetermined by fixing the semantic properties 
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of the language. The theory still properly counts as truth-conditional, however, because it 
specifies constraints upon what can be said, and so upon truth conditions. It is thus perfectly 
proper and inevitable that the theory will specify semantic properties in terms of truth 
conditions, the conditions will simply be less than determining. 
        It is in this sense that Ludlow’s idea, after Davidson, of a semantic theory inheriting the 
lexical features of the object-language is correct. It is just another way of saying that the theory 
fails to specify the range of construals the lexical item of the object-language makes available, 
but does constrain whatever values the item does take to fall within whatever the item may 
contribute to what is said. So, what’s the beef? 
            In spelling out the broad outlines of the object and purpose of a semantic theory, 
dynamic features were accommodated, but no appeal to microlanguages or concomitant 
principles were required. Microlanguages appear to be redundant, a needless posit. A semantic 
theory remains perfectly general, applying to linguistic types and specifying the conditions they 
invariantly impose upon what can be said with their tokens. What is peculiar to the level of the 
microlanguage, as it were, is something on which a semantic theory is silent, precisely because 
it is essentially extra-linguistic and so goes beyond what the relevant linguistic types can 
determine. Of course, the microlanguage phenomena are not inconsistent with the right 
semantic theory; the phenomena peculiar to particular discourse situations simply fill out the 
properties of what is said, and so what can be true, which the semantic properties of the type 
only partially determine. 
        If the above is correct, then why should Ludlow or anyone else find appeal in 
microlanguages? As far as I can see, the only motivation is due to a concern over bivalence 
Ludlow (2014, pp. 111-2).9 Let’s suppose that we presume every sentence that meets the 
relevant conditions (declarative, non-vague, etc.) to be either true or false (parameterised for 
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context). Dynamic factors appear to give the lie to bivalence, for (6) is indeterminate in truth 
value, regardless of how the world actually is, until some speaker has settled on how the 
adjective is to be construed in the relvant context: 
(6) Kansas is flat 
Yet, a semantic theory is also supposed to tell us that    
(7) ‘Kansas is flat’ is true iff Kansas is flat 
It would appear, therefore, that since the right-hand side of (7) is indeterminate, the left-hand 
side will be, too. Yet that is just to give up on bivalence, for now it is indeterminate whether a 
sentence is true. So, all instances of the T-schema will now be given up for any target sentence 
that is indeterminate. One response to this quandary, the one Ludlow entertains, is to uphold 
bivalence, but take a theory’s target to be microlanguages, where a level of ‘passing’ 
determinacy is settled on to allow for utterances to be counted as true or false. This solution, I 
think, throws the baby out with the bathwater, and is not required either. 
        A semantic theory is not supposed to be a theory of interpretation and so not a theory of 
what can be settled in a discourse setting. It is supposed to be a theory of the semantic properties 
of the language alone. The distinction is not mere whimsy, but reflects the facts of general 
structural conditions invariantly holding over discourses where variously different propositions 
are produced and consumed. In this light, an adequate theory precisely must remain general, 
and so above the contingencies of microlanguages, if it is explicitly to record those semantic 
properties fixed at the level of the type. A theory targeting microlanguages could implicitly 
record whatever is constant across microlanguages, but then the situation would simply call for 
an explicit account of such features that each speaker-hearer brings to the discourse, and such 
a theory is precisely the one we have already that targets sentence types. So, the microlanguage 
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posit appears to loose exactly what we want to capture, which can, to boot, be fully caught by 
eschewing microlanguages in the first place and keeping with sentence types. 
        The problem of bivalence remains, or so it appears. Let’s suppose we wish to retain 
bivalence. An amendment we need to make given the linguistic facts is that sentence types are 
neither true nor false, but that is no loss, for they are simply not the kind of things that can 
possess truth value. Ludlow is right: what has truth value are the utterances with their peculiar 
construals that may take place in a discourse setting. What a theory of truth conditions records 
is not the precise conditions under which any utterance would be true, but schematic or partial 
information of the kind that constrains rather than determines what is sayable with a sentence 
of the type. So, in specifying truth conditions for a sentence type, general conditions are given 
for a sentence type free of content-determining factors. Both sides, as it were, are thus 
reciprocally underspecified such that, say, no speaker ever intends to speak of a red pen as 
such, for there can be no such thing, but, for all that, linguistic properties of red pen constraint 
what he can say. Likewise, the world cannot contain red pens as such, even though the various 
ways for a pen to count as red all count as instances of red pens. Thus, to swap examples, (7) 
can be perfectly true, even if (6) as a type is indeterminate. The point is that both sides share a 
lack of specificity but count as equivalences, if construed jointly. Thus, one might render (7) 
as 
(8) ‘Kansas is flat’ is true, on some construal, iff, construed the same way, Kansas is flat  
Of course, such a paraphrase is not part of the theoretical machinery, and that is no loss. The 
paraphrase is simply a way of marking that the theory specifies general structural information 
that constrains what can be said with sentences without determining any specific proposition, 
and so the truth conditions are real, albeit schematic. The situation, of course, is perfectly 
familiar from the study of formal uninterpreted languages. We can say that this or that formula 
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is true, but mean to talk of instances of the formula. Just so here, save that what is to count as 
an instance is not a matter that can be nailed down model-theoretically, but remains a matter to 
discover given the various construals the lexicon makes available or which can be negotiated. 
Still, bivalence is retained.   
5: Conclusion 
I commend my alternative proposal to Ludlow and anyone else who admires the truth-
conditional approach to semantics while being equally struck by the irresolvable 
underdetermination of linguistic content. Ludlow has identified the right problem and offered 
a nice solution. I think a better solution is available that costs less and does a better job. Still, 
in philosophy, asking the right questions is the important thing. All the answers have a tendency 
to be kinda wrong. I endeavour to be less wrong than Ludlow.10 
Notes  
1 Think of LF as a syntactic level that realises certain structural or logical features of meaning, 
such as argument structure, scope assignment, variable assignment, and so on. See May (1977, 
1985) and Chomsky (1981) for seminal discussion. It doesn’t matter to the following whether 
LF is viewed as an independently constituted syntactic level or as simply a cipher for whatever 
syntactic properties fix the relevant features of semantics.   
2 The basic thought here is that a semantic theory does not indulge in general conceptual 
analysis (bracket the issue of meaning postulates), but simply maps metalanguage expressions 
onto object-language ones with an understood preservation of extension. Of course, a semantic 
theory should and does do more insofar as it captures algebraic aspects of argument structure, 
functional properties (tense, modality, etc.), and relations of scope and quantification. Still, 





component that simply maps unitary concepts onto unitary lexical items. See Glanzberg (2014) 
for an insightful discussion of this issue.  
3 Ludlow dwells on kind nominals (artefact and natural), but examples can be readily developed 
for verbs and adjectives, and all kinds of other nominals. Closed class items appear 
insusceptible, presumably because they express functional/structural relations, which fall 
outside of negotiations over what is to count as an instance. See note 2. 
4 For broad discussion of underdetermination, see Recanati (2004) and Carston (2002). The 
basic insight, however, is long-standing; see, for example, Austin (1962) and Ziff (1972). 
5 Again, see Asher (2011). 
6 Perhaps too swayed. There is a growing literature, initiated by Borer (2005a, 2005b), that 
rejects lexical complexity in favour of lexical roots as unstructured atoms. My present point, 
however, simply presupposes that all parties accept complex lexical items.  
7 Here, I treat a name as if it simply picks out an object. An standard Montagovian treatment 
takes a name n to pick out a set of properties possessed by some entity (λP.P(n)), such that 
predicating a property R of n is true iff R is one of the properties P possessed by n.  There are 
other ways of proceeding.  
8 Lahav, for one, pitches underdetermination as a problem for compositionality. Such a putative 
quandary has attracted a number of solutions via the semantic accommodation of context (cp., 
Reimer, 2002, and Szabó, 2001). Similarly, Travis has been taken to raise issues for 
compositionality and been dealt with in a similar manner (cp., Predelli, 2004; Kennedy and 
McNally, 2010; Lasersohn, 2012). Regardless of how successful or otherwise justified such 
responses might be, my current appeal to the style of reasoning Lahav and Travis popularised 
pertains just to the identification of underdetermination phenomena. For what it is worth, I 
think it is clear that some notion of compositionality remains unmolested by 




invariant proposition. Independent work must show whether or not the relevant contextual 
factors are genuinely extra-linguistic or somehow under a linguistic license. For present 
purposes, I am simply assuming the latter.          
9 Ludlow thanks David Braun for raising the issue. Lepore and Ludwig (2005, pp. 138-42) 
address essentially the same concern in review of Davidson’s ‘mystery’-transferring stratagem 
whereby lexical properties of the object-language are simply inherited by the metalanguage.  
10 My thanks go to Herman Cappelen for the kind invitation to contribute to this symposium 
and to Peter Ludlow, for various discussions of these issues over the years.  
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